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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of a user-veriﬁcation system for a smart gun,
which is based on grip-pattern recognition. An existing pressure sensor consisting of an array of 44 £ 44 piezo-
resistive elements is used to measure the grip pattern. An interface has been developed to acquire pressure images
from the sensor. The values of the pixels in the pressure-pattern images are used as inputs for a veriﬁcation
algorithm, which is currently implemented in software on a PC. The veriﬁcation algorithm is based on a likelihood-
ratio classiﬁer for Gaussian probability densities. First results indicate that it is feasible to use grip-pattern
recognition for biometric veriﬁcation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays there is a growing interest in personalized applications that use biometrics as an access key. Well-
known methods use ﬁngerprints, hand geometry, iris scans, or voice characteristics to identify a person or to
verify a person’s identity. Since technology is improving and becoming more aﬀordable, biometrics is becoming
more popular for daily use. Powerful processors provide the possibility of doing complex calculations on large
sets of data within a short time. This creates new possibilities for high-speed veriﬁcation or even identiﬁcation
for many everyday applications.
This paper describes part of the development of a security system for a personalized handgun, a so-called ‘smart
gun’, that makes use use of biometric veriﬁcation. The biometric features that are used are those of the two-
dimensional pattern of the pressure that is exerted on the gun’s butt. This pressure pattern will be further
referred to as the grip pattern. The goal of the ongoing research is to contribute to a weapon that can only be
ﬁred by the rightful user.
The smart-gun concept receives great interest in the US, where weapon safety is an important issue. The
technology described here might help to prevent many accidents at home, where young children get to play with
their parent’s guns.1,2 Also the police (in the US as well as elsewhere) show interest, since carrying a gun in
public brings considerable risks. In the US vital statistics show that about 8% of the law-enforcement oﬃcers,
who are killed in a shooting incident, are shot with their own weapon.3
Today there are already several types of smart guns available on the market varying from simple trigger locks4
to more advanced electronically or magnetically controlled systems.5,6 These systems are in general not person-
alized, because they are controlled by a transmissible magnetic or electronic key. They may also be vulnerable
to interference and illegal access with forged keys.
This paper describes the ﬁrst steps of the development and the testing of a prototype biometric security system
for a smart gun based on grip-pattern recognition. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the system’s hardware. The
algorithm for the biometric veriﬁcation is discussed in Section 3. Subsequently, a ﬁrst experimental evaluation
the system and its results, which are promising, are explained in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are presented
in Section 5.
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Figure 1. High-level description of the smart-gun veriﬁcation system.
Figure 2. The sensor wrapped around the gun’s butt.
2. HARDWARE
The smart-gun veriﬁcation system can be subdivided into the following 4 blocks: Sensor, Data-Acquisition
Module (DAM), Data Processing (DP), and Gun Control (GC). These blocks are shown in Fig. 1 and brieﬂy
discussed below.
The DAM consists of an analog measuring circuit, which is controlled by digital logic. The acquired data is
currently transmitted to a PC (DP), which processes the data with a veriﬁcation algorithm. The Gun Control,
responsible for controlling the locking mechanism, has not been implemented yet. The depicted control signals
can be used to activate and manage the electronics for power saving purposes.
The sensor that is used for this project is a piezo-resistive pressure sensor made by the company Tekscan Inc7
with a range of 0 ¡ 30PSI. It is available in a size that ﬁts the prototype gun butt, which is that of a Walther
P5, see Fig. 2. This sensor consists of two layers of strong and ﬂexible polyester foil. Each layer has 44 silver
electrode strips deposited on one side. One layer has vertical and the other horizontal strips. A piezo-resistive ink
has been printed on top of the silver leads. This construction results in a network of silver strips with a resistive
element at each crossing. The entire sensor array can be modelled as a 44 £ 44 network of variable resistors.
Fig. 3 shows a schematic diagram of the sensor construction (left) and an example of the resistor-network model
containing 4 £ 4 resistors (right). The resistive elements are sensitive to pressure and have a resistance of more
than 5 MΩ at zero load and about 20 kΩ at full load.
The grip pattern is measured by determining each resistor value. This is done by subsequently connecting the
horizontal and vertical conductors to an analog measuring circuit. The connections can be altered by multiplexers
controlled by digital logic. The analogue and digital circuitry are described in detail in Ref. 8. After analog-to-
digital conversion, the pixels in the pressure pattern are represented by 8-bit integers.
3. VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
The veriﬁcation algorithm is based on a likelihood-ratio classiﬁer for Gaussian probability densities.9,10 The
values of the pixels of the pressure patterns are the features for a veriﬁcation algorithm. Figure 4 shows the
average grip patterns of 4 users. The grip patterns shown are clearly diﬀerent.
The pixel values are arranged in a (in this case 44£44 = 1936-dimensional) column vector x. The feature vector
x is normalized, i.e. kxk2 = 1, prior to classiﬁcation. The reason for this normalization is twofold. First, itR11￿ R12￿ R13￿
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Figure 3. Schematic diagram of the sensor construction
7 (left) and an example of the resistor-network model containing
4 £ 4 resistors (right).
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Figure 4. Gray-scale images of the average grip patterns of 4 users.compensates for the aging of the sensor, due to which the resistance changes with time. Second, it reduces the
variations of the grip patterns, which is beneﬁcial for the recognition results.
Measured data can originate form a genuine user or from an impostor. The genuine data of a speciﬁc user is
characterized by a mean ¹W and a covariance matrix ΣW, where the subscript W denotes ‘Within-class’, while
the impostor data is characterized by ¹T and ΣT, where the subscript T denotes ‘Total’. The similarity score
S(x) to the genuine user of a measurement x is derived from the log-likelihood ratio. It is calculated by
S(x) = ¡(x ¡ ¹W)0Σ
¡1
W (x ¡ ¹W) + (x ¡ ¹T)0Σ
¡1
T (x ¡ ¹T): (1)
The 0 denotes matrix or vector transposition. If S(x) is above a predetermined threshold T, the user is accepted,
otherwise he is rejected.
In practice, the means and covariance matrices are unknown and have to be estimated from a set of training
data. In our case, the sensor network has 44 £ 44 = 1936 nodes, and the feature vectors have equally many
elements. Therefore, the number of examples needs to be greater than 1936 in order to prevent the covariance
matrices from being singular and much greater than 1936 for a good estimate. Evidently, this large number
of measurements would be impractical for user enrollment. Moreover, even if enough measurements would be
available, the evaluation of (1) would, with 1936-dimensional feature vectors, still be too high a computational
burden.
These problems are solved by whitening the feature space and at the same time reducing its dimensions. The
ﬁrst step is a Principal Component Analysis (PCA),11 determining the most important dimensions (with the
greatest variance) by doing a singular value decomposition (SVD) on the matrix X, of which the columns are the
feature vectors in the training set. The data matrix X has Nraw = 1936 rows and Nex columns. The columns are
training examples taken from Nuser users. We assume that X has zero column mean. If necessary, the column
mean has to be subtracted from the data matrix prior to SVD. As a result of the SVD the data matrix X is
written as
X = UXSXV0
X; (2)
with UX an Nraw £Nex orthonormal matrix spanning the column space of X, SX an Nex £Nex diagonal matrix
of which the (non-negative) diagonal elements are the singular values of X in descending order, and VX an
Nex £ Nex orthonormal matrix spanning the row space of X. The whitening and the ﬁrst dimension-reduction
step are achieved as follows. Let the Nraw £ NPCA matrix UPCA be the submatrix of U consisting of the ﬁrst
NPCA < Nex columns. Furthermore, let the NPCA £ NPCA matrix SPCA be the ﬁrst principal NPCA £ NPCA
submatrix of S. Finally, let the Nex £ NPCA matrix VPCA be the submatrix of V consisting of the ﬁrst NPCA
columns. The whitened data matrix with reduced dimensions is now given by
Y =
p
Nex ¡ 1V0
PCA: (3)
The resulting dimension NPCA must be chosen such that only the relevant dimensions, i.e. with suﬃciently high
corresponding singular values are kept. A minimum requirement is that all diagonal element of SPCA are strictly
positive. The corresponding whitening transform is
Twhite =
p
Nex ¡ 1 S
¡1
PCAU0
PCA: (4)
Estimating the total mean and the total covariance matrix from Y would result into ¹T = 0 and ΣT =
1
Nex¡1YY0 = I.
The whitened matrix Y can now be used to estimate the within-class covariance matrices. Here we make the
simplifying assumption that the within-class variations of all users are characterized by one within-class covariance
matrix ΣW. The reason is that often not enough user data are available to reliably estimate individual within-
class covariance matrices. First, note that the users’ contributions to the training data can be ordered such
that
Y = (Y1;:::;YNuser); (5)
with Yi the whitened data from user i. The column mean ¹i from Yi estimates the mean feature vector of user
i after whitening. The matrix
W = (Y1 ¡ ¹1;:::;YNuser ¡ ¹Nuser) (6)contains all variations around the means. Note that the within-class covariance matrix after whitening can
now be estimated by ΣW = 1
Nex¡1WW0, but instead we will proceed immediately to estimating a diagonalized
version of ΣW. A second SVD on W results in
W = UWSWV0
W; (7)
with UW an NPCA£NPCA orthonormal matrix spanning the column space of W, SW an NPCA£NPCA diagonal
matrix of which the (non-negative) diagonal elements are the singular values of W in descending order, and VW
an Nex £ NPCA orthonormal matrix spanning the row space of W. The within-class covariance matrix can
be diagonalized by pre-multiplying W by U0
W. This transformation can also be applied to the whitened data
Y, and thus to the within-class means ¹i, because it does not aﬀect the whitening nor that ΣT = I. For the
resulting, diagonal, within-class covariance matrix, further denoted by Λ, we have
Λ =
1
Nex ¡ 1
S2
W: (8)
For the resulting within-class means, further denoted by ºi, we have
ºi = U0
W¹i; i = 1;:::;Nuser: (9)
It can be shown, but this falls outside the scope of this paper, that
Λj;j = 1; j = 1;:::;NPCA ¡ Nuser + 1; (10)
(ºi)j = 0; j = 1;:::;NPCA ¡ Nuser + 1: (11)
This means that only the last Nuser ¡ 1 dimensions of U0
WW can contribute to the veriﬁcation. Therefore, a
further dimension reduction is obtained by discarding the ﬁrst NPCA ¡ Nuser + 1 dimensions in U0
WW. This
can be achieved by pre-multiplying W by a transformation matrix U0
LDA, with ULDA the submatrix of UW
consisting of the last Nuser ¡ 1 columns. The subscript LDA, which stands for Linear Discriminant Analysis, is
used, because this operation is, in fact, a dimension reduction by means of LDA.11 The notations Λ and ºi will
be maintained for the within-class covariance matrix and the within-class means.
The sequence of transformations described above can be replaced by one multiplication by an (Nuser ¡1)£Nraw
matrix, denoted by
T =
p
Nex ¡ 1U0
LDAS
¡1
PCAU0
PCA: (12)
Let y = Tx denote a transformed input feature vector, then the similarity score (1) computed for user i becomes
Si(y) = ¡(y ¡ ºi)0Λ¡1(y ¡ ºi) + y0y: (13)
Because Λ is a diagonal matrix and has much smaller dimensions ((Nuser ¡ 1) £ (Nuser ¡ 1)) than the original
covariances matrices (Nraw £ Nraw) in (1), the number of computations has decreased considerably. In the
experiments that are described in the following section, we have that Nuser = 26 and Nraw = 1936. This means
that the number of operations needed to evaluate (13) in combination with the transform (12) is about a factor
of 800 less than the number of operations needed to evaluate (1). Nearly all of the computational burden is in
the computation of the transform (12).
A further dimension reduction is possible, either by a user-independent transform by means of LDA, or by a
user-dependent transform, such as the new Maximum Divergence Analysis (MDA) technique, which has been
developed by the authors. Both techniques will reduce the computational load and may have a positive eﬀect
on the veriﬁcation performance on a test set which is diﬀerent from the training set, but will not be discussed in
this contribution.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As described in Section 3 a decision is made by comparing the similarity score (13) to a threshold T. If S(y) > T,
then the user is accepted, otherwise he is rejected. This may lead to two types of errors: the false acceptance
of an impostor and the false rejection of an authorized user. The probability of a false acceptance is the False-
Acceptance Rate (FAR). The probability of a false rejection is the False-Reject Rate (FRR). There is a trade-oﬀ
between FAR and FRR, governed by the choice of T. The Equal-Error Rate (EER), i.e. the value of FAR and
FRR when T is such that FAR and FRR are equal, is often used as a performance measure.
Before the performance can be assessed, the parameter NPCA has to be set. Although the feature vector is always
reduced to a dimension Nuser ¡ 1, the veriﬁcation performance depends on NPCA. The optimal value has been
found experimentally by determining the system’s (EER) for diﬀerent values of NPCA. As a (ﬂat) optimum we
found NPCA = 3Nuser.
4.1. Method
For the experiment a collection of 855 handgrip patterns was gathered from a group of 26 mostly untrained
subjects. From each subject 30 to 100 right-hand grip images were taken. Between every three measurements
the subject was asked to completely renew his grip by releasing the gun and retaking it. The three measurements
for the same grip register variations in the pressure while holding the same grip, since it is quite impossible to
maintain a constant (within the DAM’s precision) grip-pressure distribution. The renewal of the grip is necessary
to register variations in the grip.
The data were randomly split into a training and a test set of, nearly, equal sizes. This was done in such a way
that the three measurements for the same grip were kept together.
The total mean, the diagonal within-class covariance matrix Λ (8), the within-class means ºi (9) and the total
transform matrix T (12) were estimated from the training set. Similarity scores (13) were computed for all the
data in the training and in the test set. For each user the similarity scores were divided into genuine matching
scores, i.e. the y and the ºi in (13) correspond to the same user, and impostor matching scores, i.e. the y and the
ºi in (13) correspond to diﬀerent users. This resulted in 15–50 genuine matching scores and 805–840 impostor
matching scores per user.
4.2. Results and discussion
Both the training and test sets were used to determine the EER for each user, the average EER and the overall
EER. The latter is the EER that is obtained when all the genuine similarity scores are taken together and all
the impostor similarity scores are taken together. This would be the EER if the same threshold T were used for
all users. The results are shown in Table 1.
The veriﬁcation results obtained on the training set seem perfect. This seems also the case for the results for 16
users obtained on the test set. An average EER of 1.8% is reasonable, but probably not yet good enough for
the application in a police gun, where the FRR should be extremely low. In The Netherlands the probability of
malfunctioning of a police gun must be below 10¡4. Nevertheless, these results are promising and they clearly
indicate that the grip pattern contains suﬃcient information that can be used for veriﬁcation. However, it is
also true that not enough data were available to reliably estimate the lower EERs and that the current values
for the EERs are not precise enough to make a well-founded statement about the performance of the system. To
achieve this, more data are needed from a greater population and with more scans per subject. Probably another
important aspect, that determines the outcome’s precision, is the (lack of) shooting experience of the subjects.
It appeared that the more experienced subjects (who had handled the gun more often and over a longer period)
always had perfect veriﬁcation results. To approximate realistic situations, the data should be collected from
experienced subjects at a shooting range.Table 1. The EER for each user, the average EER and the overall EER.
User Training Test
1 0 0
2 0 0.0406
3 0 0
4 0 0
5 0 0
6 0 0.0418
7 0 0.0382
8 0 0
9 0 0
10 0 0.0588
11 0 0
12 0 0.0406
13 0 0
14 0 0.0673
15 0 0.0358
16 0 0.0564
17 0 0.0661
18 0 0
19 0 0
20 0 0
21 0 0
22 0 0.0576
23 0 0
24 0 0
25 0 0
26 0 0
Average 0 0.0177
Overall 0 0.0515
5. CONCLUSIONS
The current hardware implementation has proven to be useful for the ﬁrst experiments and demonstrations.
The piezo-resistive sensor array of the Tekscan sensor has been found suitable for detecting handgrip squeeze
patterns and appeared to be a good option for a low-cost experimental setup. The current system uses a PC
for the implementation of the veriﬁcation algorithm. Though the training of the system requires some extensive
computations, the veriﬁcation part is quite straightforward and suitable for an eﬃcient hardware implementation.
The test results indicate that the grip pattern contains suﬃcient information that can be used for veriﬁcation.
The current values for the EERs are not precise enough to make a well-founded statement about the performance
of the system. This is caused by the limited number of data that was collected for training and testing.
Further improvements can be expected from a better modelling of the within-class covariance matrix of the
intended user group, i.e. the police. This is based on the observation that experienced marksmen show very
little variation in the way the hold their weapon. It is also worth investigating a further dimension reduction to
a value below the number of users. This is likely to improve the performance on the test set and thus in the real
world.
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